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ABSTRACT
The implementation of Total Quality Leadership (TQL) into
the Surface Warfare Navy requires specific leadership training
for the entire community. A training needs analysis was
conducted to examine these training requirements for Surface
Warfare Officers. First, personnel who are already using TQL
at different Navy facilities were interviewed to determine the
areas where TQL principles are applicable in the Surface Navy.
Next, the Officer Survey Instrument (OSI) data base provided
the information to determine the leadership competencies that
are currently being used by Surface Warfare Officers.
Finally, current Navy leadership training was examined to see
if these competencies were being incorporated into the officer
training program. Existing Surface Warfare Officer leadership
training addresses many of the ?rescribed management
principles of TQL, and fleet officers demonstrate many
characteristics in congruence with the requirements of this
new management style. However, more emphasis is required In
some areas. The strong support provided by the Chief of Naval
Operations coupled with a systematic and continuous training
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Executive Stoering CoMMittee (NSC)
The ESC is represented by the highest level of management.
In the Surface Navy, ESC membership probably would include
the commanding officer, the executive officer and all the
department heads.
The ESC formulates the organization's strategic goals
toward its quality improvement efforts. To define these
goals, ESC must identify products and/or services requirements
from all its customers. These goals are ranked for quality
improvement. Of course there are costs associated in the
quality improvement efforts. ESC is expected to provide all
the necessary support and resources.
Quality Management Boards (QMB)
QMB is a permanent cross-functional team made up of top
and mid-level managers who are jointly responsible for a
specific product or service. The membership structure is
intended to encourage cooperation facilitate communication by
providing vertical and horizontal links throughout the
organization.
viii
In the surface navy, a QMB team membership would include
a department head, division officers, chief petty officers and
the leading petty officers.
QMB determines the areas in the organization that impact
its goals and work directly with the ESC in defining
indicators of quality improvement and costs savings.
QMB organizes the Process Action Teams (PAT's) who deal
directly with the processes involved. The PAT's provide the
QMB information which the latter can use in studying the
process. QMB finds common causes of variation that lead to
poor quality and makes the changes necessary to improve
performance. QMB tracks the process for any improvement
caused by the changes that were made on the process.
Process Action Team (PAT)
PAT is comprised of the workers involved in the process
being investigated by the QMB. PAT members are selected by





1. A New Industrial Revolution
The American business complex is undergoing a new
industrial revolution. This revolution was forced on American
industries by the incursion of foreign industries, led by the
Japanese, into the American market place. With it came the
increasing demand for foreign products by the American
consumers. Their products possess better quality and are sold
at a competitive price. In the automobile industry, for
example, Hondas out sold Pintos and Vegas lost out to the
Datsuns. [Ref. 1:pp. 34-37)
The consumers demanded and received quality
merchandise at a competitive price. But how was Japan able to
produce higher quality goods at lower prices? Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS) wanted to know why this situation
existed in its recording alliance with Sony Corporation of
Japar. Sony's records were produced with the identical master
disks, record presses and plastic blanks as those records
produced stateside by CBS. However, Sony consistently
produced higher quality records at a lower price. The only
difference between the two companies was the management system
employed by Sony Corporation called Total Quality Management
(TQM). [Ref. 2:p. 8]
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2. Department of Defonse and Total Quality Leadership
The Department of Defense (DoD) has joined this new
industrial revolution. The defense budget as a percentage of
the Gross National Product has shrunk since the early Reagan
years. With less resources available the DoD has become
increasingly aware of the need to receive or produce goods at
a low price without sacrificing quality. The first inroads
TQM had in the DoD came in as a result of a memorandum on
DoD's posture on quality issued by then Secretary of Defense,
Frank Carlucci, on March 30, 1988. The memorandum called for
a "focus on quality" as a key in "achieving higher levels of
performance" throughout the DoD by implementing TQM. (Ref. 3]
The original thrust of the TQM implementation was
primarily in the areas of acquisition and engineering. Its
initial success had been tremendous, specifically in the Naval
Aviation Depots (NADEPs) and Naval Supply Centers. As a
direct result of TQM, the NADEP at Naval Air Station North
Island, California saved $673,000 in the F-14 overhaul process
in one year alone. [Ref. 4:p. 32] Money savings such as this
caused TQM to gain wide acceptance within the DoD. Its
application in the DoD expanded to the areas of naval aviator
training, medicine, ship repair facilities, general admin.-
tration and human resources management. Recently, the Chief
of Naval Operations extended the use of TQM, which he renamed
2
Total Quality Leadership (TQL)I for the Navy, to include
operational assets.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. The Objective
This thesis investigates the leadership training
requirements associated with the implementation of Total
Quality Leadership (TQL) into the Surface Warfare Officer
(SWO) training pipeline. The objective is to identify the
leadership competencies supportive of the TQL concept by
conducting a three-pronged training needs analysis.
In order to establish how TQL techniques apply in the
Surface Navy, the Officer Survey Instrument (OSI) data base
will be analyzed to identify the current leadership and
management competencies being exercised in the fleet today.
Cognizant naval TQL authorities from commands currently
applying the TQL concept will be interviewed to identify their
areas of successes and failures concerning both TQL
implementation and operations. Finally, the current
Leadership and Management Education Training (LMET)2 courses
used in the SWO school command will be examined to determine
if the needed TQL leadership competencies are currently being
taught.
'Total Quality Management (TQM) and Total Quality Leadership
(TQL) will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
2The Navy is currently in the process of changing the name of
its LMET courses to Navy Leader (NAVLEAD).
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2. The Research Questions
The following specific research questions are
addressed:
a. Primary research question: Does the leadership
training currently taught to surface warfare officers give the
leadership knowledge necessary to support the implementation
of TQL in the Department of Defense (DoD)?
b. Subsidiary questions:
(1) Which of the TQL principles can be applied to
the Surface Navy?
(2) What leadership competencies supportive to
the TQL principles are currently being practiced in the fleet?
(3) To what extent are the leadership courses
taught to SWOs in congruence with the leadership competency
requirements of TQL?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
To facilitate a manageable thesis, the following scope,
limitations and assumptions are noted:
1. Scope
This thesis addresses TQL as it applies to the surface
warfare community. The basis of this thesis is derived from
data obtained from the OSI, interviews with cognizant TQL Navy
personnel, review of pertinent TQL literature, and examination
of current SWO leadership training courses.
This thesis does not attempt to justify the need to
use TQL as a management tool. We believe that the Navy as a
4
part of DoD has already decided to apply the TQL concept
service wide. We do not attempt to prove or disprove the
merits of TQL, this has been done in both the civilian and the
military work place.
2. Limitations
This thesis is limited to the study of the TQM
leadership competencies that are applicable to the Surface
Navy. The data from the OSI survey is limited to 266 SWOs
responses. The OSI was administered to 10,000 naval officers,
from all Navy communities, by the Navy Occupational Data
Analysis Center (NODAC) in July of 1988. Our work also
includes data extracted from interviews with over twenty
cognizant naval TQL authorities. Additional information was
obtained from current LMET course and Command Excellence
outlines. This thesis extracts and combines leadership
competencies related to the TQL concept that we believe will
work in the Surface Navy.
3. Assumptions
This thesis assumes that the reader possesses some
working knowledge of the TQM principles (See Glossary for TQL
Organizational Structure). Furthermore, it is assumed that
the Navy will seriously consider utilizing the existing Navy
leadership training courses as a vehicle to train its
personnel on TQM principles.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. EDUCATIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS
The Surface Navy has stated the implementation of TQL as
a goal. To accomplish this goal, a plan must be developed to
train its officers and enlisted ranks in the competencies of
leadership used in this method. The Instructional Systems
Design (ISD) is the required method for developing an
instructional program in the DoD. [Ref. 5]
ISD is a systems-analysis approach which is used in
developing new programs of instruction. [Ref. 6] The goals
of ISD are to "make the training both job relevant and cost-
effective and efficient." To accomplish these goals four
procedures are followed. First, teams of subject knowledge
experts are formed to provide an information and expertise
base. Next, complex tasks are broken down to less complicated
forms from which models or simplified descriptions are built.
Then systematic solutions to the tasks detailed earlier are
developed by the expert teams. Finally, operational tests are
used as a continual feedback loop to determine any further
modification requirements to the developed training. [Ref.
7:pp. 3-7)
As a part of ISD, a training needs analysis is required to
form a basis for this training plan. Many organizations fail
to properly train their personnel since they are often "more
interested in conducting the training program than in
6
assessing the needs of their organization". [Ref. 8:p. 17]
Therefore, we feel a training needs assessment is required to
ensure that good, useful training is developed before the Navy
embarks on TQL training.
To meet this requirement we use the three-pronged educa-
tional needs analysis shown in Figure 1 below. This needs
NEEDS ANALYSIS
Figure 1
Three-Pronged Educational Needs Analysis
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analysis is based on the Paul M. Muchinsky model for a
training needs analysis. [Ref. 9:pp. 249-259]
The needs analysis determines what TQL principles are
applicable to the Surface Navy. The fleet is examined to
determine what TQL principles, if any, are already present.
Finally, SWO leadership training is examined to see if TQL
competencies are currently being taught. This triad is
comparable with Muchinsky's three-step process that involves
organization, operations and person analysis. Once
differences between the TQL requirements and the current
practices of the fleet are identified, the SWO training
pipeline can be modified to eliminate this training
deficiency.
B. LMIT
LMET is the Navy's method to introduce managerial and
leadership skills to personnel at both the officer (Division
Officer and Department Heads) and enlisted levels. LMET's
roots can be traced back to 1970 when the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) ADM Elmo Zumwalt ordered the development of
the Human Goals Program (HGP). HGP consisted of leadership
training, race relations, alcohol counseling and overseas
diplomacy. This leadership course went through several name
and substance changes until 1975. In that year, McBer and
Company of Boston (McBer) were contracted to improve the, then
named, Human Resources Management Program. [Ref. 10:pp. 30-
31]
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McBer conducted two research studies sponsored by the
Navy, which presently form the backbone of leadership training
courses taught throughout the Navy. McBer's first research
study involved the analysis of the individual performance of
supervisory personnel. The analysis revealed leadership
competencies that were common to all outstanding supervisory
personnel and missing from average supervisory personnel.
These leadership competencies have been distilled down to ten
competencies at the Department Head School and thirteen
competencies at Division Officer Course. [Ref. 11:pp. 36-51]
McBer's second study looked at superior performing
commands to identify performance characteristics that
distinguish outstanding commands from average commands. From
their results, McBer built a command effectiveness model that
consists of thirteen components divided into three major areas
as shown in Figure 2 below. [Ref. 12:pp. A-1 - A-4] McBer is
still under contract to conduct research to keep LMET abreast
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Source: Command Excellence: What it takes to Be the Best!
Department Head School is a six-month school attended by
all prospective department heads in the Surface Navy as a part
of their training pipeline. Students at Department Head
school receive the LMET course as part of the school's
administrative curriculum. This ccursc teaches the ten
competencies identified in McBer's first study that are
required for a new department head to be an effective leader
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and a good manager. The LMET course also instructs the
students in the findings of McBer's second study, which
produced the command effectiveness model. [Ref. 14:p. i]
The prospective division officers receive their LMET
course after completing their basic division officer training
in the areas of seamanship, engineering, administration, and
combat systems. LMET, a part of this basic training, is
designed to give the newly commissioned ensign an idea of what
leadership is all about before the ensign reports to the first
shipboard assignment. This course is also based on the
results of McBer's research into what competencies make good
leaders.
C. COMMAND EXCELLENCE
The Command Excellence Program is also based on Mcber's
second study. That study looked at operational units from the
air, surface, and submarine warfare communities to identify
characteristics that make outstanding commands different from
average performing commands. As a part of this study,
outstanding ships were identified by end users, that is
Squadron Commanders or higher. These ships were compared with
each other to identify common attributes that made them highly
successful. [Ref. 15:pp. 3-8] Command Excellence forms the
basis for the leadership training of the students at the
Prospective Executive Officer (PXO) and Prospective Commanding
Officer (PCO) schools.
11
D. TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP
To gain an insight into TQL a basic understanding of its
meaning is required. TQM is the civilian management tool upon
which TQL gains its foundation. TQM represents a paradigm
shift in how corporations manage their businesses. [Ref.
16:p. iii]
As the name suggests, quality is the central theme of TQM.
The first effort in quality control came in the 1930's with
the work of Dr. Walter A. Shewhart, a statistician from Bell
Telephone Laboratories in New York. Dr. Shewhart believed
that statistical analysis could be used in a manufacturing
environment to gain a higher level of quality. [Ref. 17:pp.
6-8] The opposing and more popular belief at the time was
based on the time and motion studies conducted by Dr.
Frederick Taylor. Dr. Taylor found that efficiency, and
therefore quality, could be improved by a reward system for
production effort. [Ref. 18:p. 9] Highly productive workers
were studied to provide the patterns for other workers to
follow. Pay incentives for higher production were used.
Taylor's theory appeared to be well founded but the emphasis
on the production volume did little to improve quality. It
did, however, cause great employee stress as was indicated by
a severe turnover ratio. (Ref. 19:pp. 14-15] The constant
training of new employees certainly did not improve product
quality.
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Dr. Shewhart, on the other hand, believed that through the
use of statistical control the product quality would go up and
the production costs would go down. By determining the
product's quality via statistical methods he could determine
if the product's variance from acceptable standards was due to
the design limits of the equipment, or if the variation was a
result of the other factors in the process such as raw
materials or operator training. Additionally, a worker could
inspect his own output and discard unsatisfactory goods before
it became a final product. [Ref. 20:pp. 6-7] An example
would be in the manufacturing process of a bearing that
requires a specific size diameter as a tolerance. If a
bearing size was out of tolerance, statistical analysis might
indicate the possibility of correcting the problem with a
simple machine adjustment by the worker. Or, the analysis
could also show that no matter how much adjusting was done to
the machine, the bearing would never be within acceptable
limits because the problem was with the machine itself. As a
result, any adjustment by the worker to the machine could
cause size variations to otherwise perfectly specified
bearings. Regardless, application of statistical analysis
could determine the tolerances for each case.
The thrust of Dr. Shewhart's work was his conclusion that
production numbers should be replaced with statistical control
of quality. Better products, though fewer in number, would be
more profitable.
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During World War II, the suppliers of war goods in the
United States resorted to statistical control to provide the
manufacturing basis for the defense of our country. Dr. F.
Edwards Deming, a co-worker of Dr. Shewhart's, had been
instrumental in developing war time production methods used by
American industries. His efforts in training wartime
industrial workers in the use of statistical analysis for
quality control resulted in high quality war platforms,
weaponry and ammunition. [Ref. 21:pp. 7-8]
After the war, American industries had no competition in
the global market. European and Japanese industrial bases had
been reduced to rubble during World War II. The Russians
continued to struggle with their socialistic, agricultural
economy. Statistical control methods that resulted in high
quality goods and services during the war were replaced with
the pre-war manufacturing methods. High production output
replaced quality as management's objective. Lives were no
longer at risk due to inferior quality of finished goods.
Because competition was limited among American businesses,
consumers had nowhere else to turn for their goods if they
were not satisfied with their product's quality. If the
product had to be returned to the manufacturer for rework or
exchange, the company just absorbed the loss. The sheer
number of products sold would cover such loses. (Ref. 22:p.
8]
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In an attempt to gain a share of the world's market the
government of Japan requested assistance from the United
States. Dr. Deming went to Japan and showed the Japanese how
the United States had achieved great results during the war
effort with statistical control methods. Dr. Deming opened
the eyes of the Japanese. They embraced his ideas and
accepted his 14 principles of management shown in Table 1
below. [Ref. 23:pp. 10-21]
TABLE 1
DEMING'S 14 MA LGEMNT PRINCIPLES
1. Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of
product and service, with the aim to become competitive and to
stay in business, and to provide jobs.
2. Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic age.
Western management must awaken to the challenge, must learn
their responsibilities, and take on leadership for change.
3. Cease dependence on inspections to achieve quality.
Eliminate the need for inspection on a mass basis by building
quality into the product in the first place.
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of
price taQ. Instead, minimize total cost. Move toward a single




5. Improve constantly and forever the system, of production
and services, to improve qual_ y and productivity, and thus
constantly decrease costs.
6. Institute training of the iob.
7. Institute leadership isee point 121. The aim of
leadership should be to help people and machines and gadgets
to do a better job. Supervision of management is in need of
overhaul, as well as supervision of workers.
8. Drive out fear, so that everybody may work more
effectively for the company.
9. Break down barriers between departments. People in
research, design, sales, and production must work as a team,
to foresee problems of production and in use that may be
encountered with the product or service.
10. Eliminate slogans. exhortations. and targets for the?
work force, asking for zero defects and new levels of
productivity. Such exhortations only create adversarial
relationships, as a bulk of the causes of low quality and low
productivity belong to the system and thus lie beyond the
power of the work force.
lla. Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the factory floor.
Substitute leadership.
llb. Eliminate management by objectives. Eliminate manage-
ment by number numerical goals. Substitute leadership.
16
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly worker of his right
to pride of workmanship. The responsibility of supervisors
must be changed from sheer numbers to quality.
12b. Remove barriers that rob people in management and in
engineering of their right to pride of workmanship. This
means, inter alia, abolishment of annual or merit rating and
management by objective.
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and self-
improvement.
14. Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish the
transformation. The transformation is everybody's lob.
Source: Houston, A and Dockstader, S.L. "A Total Quality
Management Process Improvement Model", Navy Personnel Research
and Development Center, San Diego, CA, 1988.
The Japanese have re-entered the world market using TQM
with astounding results. They have dominated the car
industry, for example, by providing high quality goods at
competitive prices. Ironically, the United States industries
are embracing the newfound Japanese management style -- TQM,
an idea pioneered by an American. Many American manufacturers
are using TQM methods to reestablish themselves as makers
of quality merchandise. General Motors recently won The
17
Baldridge Award for Excellence3 for the 1990 Cadillac. The
Navy, as a part of the DoD, is relying more and more on TQL to
better the quality of its output in many new areas such as
aviator training, aircraft maintenance, acquisition, shipyard
facilities, and ship intermediate maintenance authorities
(SIMAs).
46
3The Baldridge Award is given annually to one American company
and is based on customer satisfaction.
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
Does the leadership training currently taught to SWOs give
the leadership knowledge necessary to support the implementa-
tion of TQL in DoD?
To answer our primary research question, a three-pronged
educational needs analysis was conducted. To conduct this
analysis we answered three subsidiary research questions.
First, a set of criteria was devised through interviews and a
review of pertinent literature, to establish what leadership
competencies are used in the TQL system and which, if any, are
applicable to the Surface Navy. Next, officer inputs were
examined in the statistical analysis of the OSI data to see
how their leadership competencies compare to TQL competencies.
Third, a comparison shows what competencies the officers are
lacking to be in compliance with TQL. The competencies were
compared with current LMET instruction to see what is missing
in the training process.
B. SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
1. Which of the TQL principles can be applied to the
surface Navy?
In order to determine which TQL principles can be
applied to the surface Navy, telephone interviews were
conducted with cognizant personnel assigned to naval
19
facilities where the TQL system was in use. We looked to see
where TQL was applicable and where it failed to work at these
commands. The authors conducted telephone interviews with
twenty commands including Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC), Naval Supply Center (NSC),
Norfolk, Virginia, and Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center,
Pacific (FADCPAC). NPRDC was interviewed primarily due to
their history of extensive research in TQL. Currently, NPRDC
conducts training throughout the Navy in TQL with 15 courses.
[Ref. 24] Additionally, NPRDC has conducted research in
training for the Surface Navy in the past. Their insight
provided valuable information as to how TQL principles will
work in the Surface Navy. NSC Norfolk and FADCPAC were
interviewed for both their close workings with the Surface
Navy and their familiarity with the TQL process. Again, this
valuable insight to both the surface community and TQL,
provides a unique information base not found anywhere else in
the Navy. Other commands were selected based on referrals
from fellow Naval Postgraduate School students, professors and
guest speakers. A complete list of commands where personnel
were interviewed can be found in Appendix A. These interviews
resulted in obtaining first hand information on TQM implemen-
tation and how well TQM has worked in a military environment.
Commands interviewed had been practicing TQL between six
months and five years.
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A list of open-ended questions served as the guideline
for the initial interviews (See Appendix B). As each
interviewee would lead into different areas in responding, the
authors would add questions in the process. Each respondent
was asked to critique the questions to allow the authors more
insight to TQM process.
The length of the interviews ranged from 15 to 45
minutes. Doing this oral survey allowed the authors to
carefully ensure the interviewee understood the questions as
they pertained to this thesis. The authors felt that the oral
survey provided more complete data than a written survey since
respondents were not required to write out long informative
answers. Of course, answers were also more general than those
provided by a more rigid, written survey. A content analysis
of the responses was conducted to group the data into general
topic areas that were easily differentiated.
The literature review of TQL materials provided us
with information on leadership competencies necessary to
facilitate the implementation of TQL in the Navy.
2. What leadership competencies supportive to the TQL
principles are currently being practiced in the fleet?
In order to determine what leadership competencies
supportive to TQL principles are currently being practiced in
the fleet, data from the OSI were analyzed. The OSI was
administered by NODAC in July 1988 to 10,000 naval personnel
from various naval communities. A major portion of the survey
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instrument consisted of questions (shown in Appendix C)
concerning leadership, management and professional responsi-
bilities as they apply to the officers' current job.
There were a total of 7,232 useable responses obtained
from this survey. Of these, 266 SWOs from the rank of Ensign
to Captain, who have served or are serving as division
officers or department heads, were extracted for analysis.
Not all of the survey questions were analyzed in this thesis.
Only questions on leadership characteristics and management
responsibilities that we felt are related to TQL functions
were selected and analyzed.
The Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software of the
Naval Postgraduate School computer mainframe (IBM 370/3033)
was used for data analysis. First, SAS procedure PROC MEANS
was employed to determine the percentage of time surface
warfare officers spend in each of the technical, management
and leadership functions. A summation of the three percen-
tages had to equal one hundred percent. This analysis
indicated how much time is spent by naval officers at sea in
TQL related activities.
SAS procedure PROC FREQ was used to analyze the
responses to two groups of questions. The first group of
questions dealt with leadership, while the second group dealt
with management and professional responsibilities. The
leadership analysis determined how much interaction transpires
among SWOs and the importance of these interactions.
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Additionally, the importance of individual leadership
competencies was established. Various management and
professional responsibilities were analyzed to discover how
much focus respondents place in these areas. Before
conducting this statistical analysis, the subjects were
divided into two classifications, junior officers (01 to 03)
and field grade officers (04 to 06). This classification was
performed to determine if there were differences in responses
between the two groups.
Responses to the question of how the subjects spent
their time in management or professional responsibilities were
based on an ordinal scale of 9 ranging as follows:
0 DOES NOT APPLY
1 RARELY, A VERY MINOR PART OF THE JOB
2 ******
3 OCCASIONALLY A MINOR PART OF THE JOB
4 ******
5 ROUTINELY A PART OF THE JOB
6 ******
7 A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE JOB
8 ******
9 A MAJOR FOCUS OF THE JOB
For ease of analysis, responses were grouped into
three categories. Responses 0 through 3 were categorized
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RARELY A PART OF THE JOB. Responses 4 through 6 were
categorized ROUTINELY A PART OF THE JOB. Responses 7 through
9 were categorized A MAJOR FOCUS OF THE JOB. The results of
this analysis will demonstrate what competencies supportive of
TQL are currently practiced in the fleet by SWOs in the
management and professional functions.
Responses indicating perceived importance of specific
leadership competencies in the OSI were based on an ordinal
scale of 7 ranging as follows:
0 = DOES NOT APPLY
1 = UNIMPORTANT
2 = SLIGHTLY IMPORTANT
3 = SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT
4 = MODERATELY IMPORTANT
5 = QUITE IMPORTANT
6 = HIGHLY IMPORTANT
7 = EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
The responses were grouped in three separate clusters
with 0, 1 and 2 representing unimportant, 3 and 4 representing
important, and 5, 6 and 7 representing very important. This
grouping attempted to extract the differences in the perceived
importance of the leadership competencies between the two pay
grades. These results will demonstrate what competencies
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supportive of TQL are currently practiced in the fleet by
SWOs.
Responses indicating frequency of SWO interactions
with his/her superiors, peers and subordinates were based on
an ordinal scale of 7 ranging as follows:
0 = DOES NOT APPLY
1-NEVER




6 = ALMOST ALWAYS
7 = ALWAYS
The responses were grouped in three separate clusters
with 0, 1 and 2 representing ALMOST NEVER; 3 and 4
representing ROUTINELY; and 5, 6 and 7 representing ALMOST
ALWAYS. Organizational interaction is an important element of
TQL. The result will identify any deficiencies that exist in
this area.
3. To what extent are the leadership courses taught to
SWO in congruence with the leadership competencies
requirements of TQL?
In order to determine the extent to which the
leadership training currently taught to SWOs is in congruence
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with the leadership requirements of TQL, an extensive
literature review was conducted. Military and civilian
literature were studied to get as much information as possible
on Navy leadership courses4 and the TQM concept. The course
outlines provided by Director, Pride, Professionalism and
Personal Excellence (OP-15) and Naval Education Training
Center formed the basis of the needs analysis, which
investigated what leadership competencies were currently being
taught at the SWO school command.
4The existing leadership courses examined were Command




The results are presented by addressing each of the sub-
sidiary research questions in the same format as they were
given in the methodology section of this thesis.
A. TQL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO TEE SURFACE NAVY
1. Telephone Interviews
Since open-ended questions were used in these inter-
views, the results are varied. These results, presented
below, indicate trends where the data permit. Just as
importantly, though, are the data collected that indicate how
TQL principles are working at Navy commands. Specific
examples are cited in the results below that provide the
authors answers to their research questions dealing with where
TQL principles will work in the Surface Navy.
The telephone interview respondents all shared the
common belief that TQL was the correct management system to
use at their commands. They agreed with the literature which
says that the support for TQL must start at the top. The
command must have a vision of how TQL will guide the
organization in the future. The CNO has planted a seed to
create a vision for the implementation of TQL in the
operational Navy. The required reading list, included in his
memorandum (See Appendix D) to all Flag Officers, will help
cultivate that TQL vision. [Ref. 25]
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Ninety percent of the interviewees stated that at
their commands TQL training had started at the top and had
helped in the creation of a command vision. After creating
this vision, TQL training continued downward, throughout the
organization, following the "just in time" method of training.
[Ref. 26:pp. 32-40] This method consists of a top to bottom,
layer by layer, training program. Starting with the highest
level, each layer of management must be trained and then
allowed a period of time to permit the training to be absorbed
by all members of a particular management level. [Ref. 27:p.
58] Then, the next lower level of an organization is trained
in a similar manner, until the entire work force is educated
in the TQL process. Nearly all interviewed commands stressed
the importance of a training program that followed this
format.
Since each command within the Navy is responsible for
their own TQL training, many respondents chose to use already
existing training programs to educate their upper level
managers. These included both civilian training programs
existing at IBM and military programs such as the ones offered
by NPRDC San Diego, California. One command used the IBM
program and sent top level managers to TQM Seminars given by
Tom Peters. For lower level employee training most commands
integrated the above mentioned TQL training courses with
their own. At one NSC command, a half-day, 3-week course was
given to all employees.
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The course completely described, in detail, all of the
functions of the center. This allowed the workers to become
aware of all the work processes that were involved in their
command.
In conducting the telephone interviews, we found some
problem areas in the use of TQL in the Navy. The two areas
that appear to be highly incompatible with current Navy
practices are personnel evaluation ratings and reliance on
final inspections as a means to ensure quality in goods and
services. At one facility where DoD civilians were employed,
the evaluation problem was easily solved. By changing to team
evaluations, as TQL calls for, the annual merit rating for
individuals disappeared. At another command, where having to
rank employees' performance was required by law, the
management incorporated a new set of performance criteria to
evaluate employees. This set of behaviors graded in their
performance evaluations were based on TQL principles such as
team work, training, driving out fear in the work place and
use of leadership in day to day activities. But when dealing
with active duty personnel, individual evaluations are still
required. These are still the current means to measure the
performances of thousands of people of the same pay grade,
across the entire Navy structure, when it comes time for
selection for promotion. Since the entire Navy has yet to
adopt the TQL management system, the interviewed commands
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simply continued to perform standard, Navy evaluations on
their personnel.
The opening up of communications from subordinates to
high level management was observed in .0 percent of those
interviewed. At one weapons engineering and maintenance
facility, suggestions in t'4e suggestion boxes required a
written response within one week's time. If not acted upon
within this time limit, the suggestion is passed on to the
facility's commanding officer. At the same facility, the TQL
concept of quality as defined by the customer was illustrated.
After a complete test evaluation on a particular piece of
equipment was accomplished, the equipment was sent to a
shipyard to be installed. Upon receipt of the equipment, e
similar test was completed by the shipyard personnel.
Unfortunately the results were quite differe t than those
performed by the manufacturer. Not until months of ordering
new parts had passed was the equipment able to pass the
testing phase so that ship board installation could occur.
The command started a new program that required the shipyard
to send back the equipment, a list of all tests conducted and
the results of those tests to the manufacturer. The end
result of this information exchange of data concerning the
test enabled the manufacturer to correct the discrepancies at
his end. The manufacturer now established z quality standard
based on his customer's definition of quality.
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Statistical process control (SPC) had been used at 95%
of the commands interviewed. Those commands where manufar
turing and repair work is conducted relied the heavier
SPC. An example of this can be seen at the NADEPs where the
quality of bearings were improved once their manufacturing
process was brought into statistical control. The command
which had not applied SPC was still in the beginning phases of
TQL implementation.
The literature suggest that most organizations have
difficulty in implementing TQL due primarily to resistance to
change. This resistance is evident in the work force when it
comes to changing a rating system that, for years, has been
the basis for employee promotions. Converting to team
evaluations puts workers in the unusual position of having to
rely not only on his own but his peers' performance as well.
Another source of resistance lies with managers. They do not
want to give up the power and control associated with final
inspection.
2. "'Navalized,, TQL Compared To TQM Principles
The CNO sent a memorandum to all flag officers on
August 13, 1990, concerning the implementation of TQL in the
operational Navy. In this memorandum, Admiral Kelso
"Navalized" Deming's management principles, and these are
shown in Table 2 below. The memorandum went on to describe
the product of the Navy as being combat readiness.
Additionally, the CNO called for the Navy to obtain
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superiority of this Navy product and to improve it
continuously. In general, he described the primary thrust of
TQL to be in the areas of improvement of quality, meeting the
needs of the customer, product improvement through the
improvement of process, and a focus on leadership, training
and personnel *aanagement. [Ref. 28]
TABLE 2
FOURTEEN POINTS OF TQL
("Navalized" Version of Dr. Deming's Fourteen Points)
[Ref. 29]
1. Understand the mission and principles of the Navy.
Have a clear grasp of how your command supports the Navy's
mission and how the principles apply to your day-to-day
actions.
* We are developing the words to send you for the Navy's
missions and principles. From these you can develop
the mission for your organization.
2. Quality is the essence of TQL. Insist on quality
performance and material. Do the job correctly the first
time.
3. Know your job. Analyze and understand every facet of
your responsibilities and those of your people.
4. Words alone don't solve problems. Look first at the
process and the system for faults and solutions, not the
people. Improve the process, train the people.
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5. Quality training is the key to success. People must
be fully trained to do their jobs. You are never too senior
to learn.
* To do your best is not good enough unless you are
properly trained to do the job.
6. Use analytical methods to understand and improve your
jobs. Graphs and charts, properly used, are invaluable
tools in this effort.
7. We are a team. We must work together across
departments and commands.
* We must listen to the most junior people. All are
charged of making the work place and quality of life
better. All suggestions for improvement must be
explained and action taken or rejected by the
leadership.
* The leader must provide those who suggest improvements
and ideas with feedback as to what is being done with
the suggestion. The leadership will not necessarily
adapt all ideas but the leadership must provide the
feedback on every suggestion.
8. Create an atmosphere of trust and open communication
where everyone shares a sense of pride in their work.
* Get fear out of the work place. Create an atmosphere
in which people tell you what is wrong in order that
it can be fixed.
* Unless we recognize the problems we can not improve.
* We need to reward people who have the courage to tell
us what they see that needs improvement so we can get
better.
* Good ideas and lessons learned must be transmitted and
shared between departments and commands.
9. Inspect smarter. Inspections should be methods of
learning and improvement rather than threatening events.
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* As all learn to do the job correctly the first and
every time, the number of inspections will decrease.
10. Demand quality, not quotas.
* Quality in the work place and in our lives is what we
strive for.
* If we get quality, all the other goals and quotas will
follow.
11. Education and self improvement are just as important
as training. We must always get better.
* Everyone must be involved in training and self
education.
12. All improvements, big and small alike, are important.
13. Be a leader. Your job as a supervisor is to guide and
assist your people.
* The leader gets his people tools and training they
need to do their jobs correctly.
* It's the leader's responsibility to ensure his people
are properly trained for the job before they are
placed in a position of standing a watch, starting a
pump, lighting off radar, firing a gun, loading a
missile, etc.
14. All hands, from seaman to admiral, must learn and use
TQL.
Source: Memorandum to All Flag Officers on Total Quality
Leadership dated 13 August 1990 by Chief of Naval Operations,
Frank B. Kelso, II.
The memorandum continues with an example of how TQL
can be used to assist a ship in setting material condition
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zebra in training exercises.5 In the example, the solution
to the problem of failing to correctly set zebra would be
found via TQM methods such as data collection, process review,
and team generated solution. Furthermore, Admiral Kelso
stresses that as the leader of the Navy, he is fully
supportive of TQL. A reading list is provided to familiarize
the addressees with the TQL philosophy. [Ref. 30:pp.2-3]
A comparison of TQL and TQM principles is made here to
analyze how close the Navy's TQL principles are to those
principles found in Deming's TQM. This comparison estimates
the extent that the Navy's TQL principles align with Deming's
TQM principles. In comparing the two lists of fourteen points
each, we refer to the original list by Deming (see Table 1) as
Deming's. The Navalized principles are referred to as Navy's.
The following discussion is a point by point compari-
son of the CNO's Navalized version with Deming's Management
principles. The similarities and differences with the two
sets of principles are noted.
The Navy's first point states that each command
understands the overall mission and principles of the Navy.
Furthermore, a command must perceive how it contributes to
this mission in its day to day activities. The first point of
Deming's talks of a consistency of purpose toward improvement
of the product and service that is similar the Navy's overall
sMaterial condition zebra describes the water tight condition
of a surface ship when the ship is ready for combat. In zebra, all
water tight fittings throughout the ship are secured.
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mission and principles statement. The rest of Deming's point
one discusses the need to stay in business to provide jobs.
The Navy is not in a private, competitive business and
therefore does not address this issue. The CNO is currently
developing more information on the Navy's mission and
principle statements to further guide organizations in
developing their missions. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
The Navy agrees with Deming about product improvement
and that quality is important since it forms the basis for
TQL. Both stress the importance of accomplishing tasks
correctly in the first attempt. Deming believes this is
critical because, by doing the task correctly the first time,
quality will be built into the product. Therefore, the need
for mass inspections will be eliminated. This illustrates a
minor difference between Deming and the Navy. The Navy calls
for the reduction, rather than the elimination of inspections.
They prefer to "inspect "smarter" by making inspections a less
threatening, learning experience, which will improve quality.
The Navy and Deming both state the inability of words
or slogans to accomplish goals. They agree that the primary
source of inefficiency in a system is due to the process
itself and not the people in the system. Any attempt to ask
for perfection that is beyond the limits of a particular
process', serves only to frustrate workers. Therefore, we
should look to improve the processes and not blame workers for
defects beyond their control.
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Additionally, they agree in the importance of training
the people. Quality training is stressed as the key to
success. Only when the best effort of employees is coupled
with their proper training is the effort good enough. The
Navy and Deming discuss the need for statistical control to
improve performance.
The importance of subordinates' input is emphasized,
as is the responsibility of the management to respond to the
input, by both Deming and the Navy. Team work throughout the
organization is called for by both sets of principles. This
team work is possible only once barriers between management
and the work force are dismantled. Once these barriers are
removed, an atmosphere of trust and open communications will
develop. Workers can suggest, without fear of reprisal, what
is wrong with a process so changes can be made. Unreported
problemb are hard to fix and people need to be rewarded for
the coura7 that is required to speak up when something is not
right. Furthermore, the transmission of new ideas or
solutions to problems must be shared within the command as
well as with other commands.
The Navy agrees with Deming on eliminating quotas as
a management tool. The Navy says that once quality is in
place, quotas and goals will be met. In addition, Deming
recommended substituting leadership for management by
objectives.
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Both the Navy and Deming illustrate the need for
improvements to better the processes within an organization.
This can be accomplished by guiding and assisting our sub-
ordinates. The Navy and Deming believe that leaders should
provide subordinates with the tools and training to perform
their work. Leaders must insure their people are properly
trained prior to accomplishing a task on their own. Finally,
both call for all personnel to learn and use TQL.
Conspicuously missing from the Navy's fourteen
principles are two of Deming's points. The first point is
where Deming calls for the end of awarding business on the
basis of price. Deming states that by using long term
relationships that are structured on trust and loyalty with
suppliers, total costs are lowered in the long run. The Navy
is currently prohibited by statute from conducting business in
this fashion. (Ref. 32] Deming's other principle missing
from the Navy's list is the removal of barriers caused by
annual or merit ratings. The current structure of the Navy's
promotion and retention systems are based on these exact merit
ratings.
The above comparison shows that the Navy's TQL
principles do not exactly match Deming's TQM principles, but
the Navalized list does represent most of the content of
Deming's work. This timely message certainly assists the
authors of this thesis in determining the answers to our
research question involving where TQL would work in the
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Surface Navy. Perhaps the single most important message found
in the memorandum is when Admiral Kelso stresses the fact that
he, as the leader of the Navy, fully supports TQL.
Admiral Kelso believes that Deming's system will work
in the operational assets of the Navy with the exception of
the two principles noted above. The data collected from shore
establishment where TQL is implemented illustrate similar
differences with Deming's principles. However, a trend is
developing towards resolving the difference in the merit
rating system. Although not completely removing such systems,
those shore establishments with civilian employees have begun
to modify their merit rating system in one of two ways. One
method was to change from individual to team appraisals. The
other method was to grade individuals on their performance in
terms of TQL management qualities such as team work and
subordinate development. With the experiences gained through
practical application, the Surface Navy may someday move
closer to fully embracing Deming's fourteen principles of
management.
3. Shipboard Leadership Compared To TQL
Many activities on board Navy ships contain basic
elements of the TQL process. The following examples are of
these types of practices, where they fall short in TQL
techniques, and what is needed to make them a complete TQL
process.
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Shipboard planning is accomplished weekly during
Planning Board for Training (PB4T). The TQL principle already
existing at PB4T is the practice of having a ship wide
representation of upper level management meet weekly. Similar
to the Executive Steering Committee6 (ESC), this board is
headed by the Executive Officer (XO). [Ref. 33:p. 5] Its
membership includes all department heads, Damage Control
Assistant, Off Ship Training Coordinator, Master Chief of the
Command, 3M Coordinator and the Chaplain. The XO directs the
scheduling of all essential training required by Navy
regulations. Additional training requirements requested by
members of the board are acted upon. Any problems arising on
the ship can be brought out for discussion and acted upon by
this upper management group. All upcoming extraordinary
events are discussed. A plan of the week for the coming week
is drawn and published for the crew's benefits.
PB4T falls short of all the required TQL principles
required of an ESC in several areas. They need to consider
all areas of shipboard processes, not just training and
extraordinary events. Once these processes are identified the
upper management must refrain from directing, as they do now,
the actions of the crew who are involved in these processes.
6The ESC is represented by the highest level of management and
formulates the organization's strategic goals toward its quality
improvement efforts.
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Instead, PB4T should form process action teams (PAT)7 to work
on command processes. [Ref. 34:p. 6] These teams will find
ways of improving the processes identified by the ESC. If
applicable, statistical analysis, will be employed to bring
the named process under control. Thus the people with the
most working knowledge of a process will be the people who
actually make a process more efficient. [Ref. 35:p. 7]
Another area where shipboard activities are close to
being in congruence with the TQL principles associated with
PATs is in the proper use of the chain of command. Up and
down the chain of command, individuals talk with their
counterparts from other organizations within the command. An
example is when the chief in one division speaks to the chief
of another division to discuss possible alternatives of best
solving a particular problem that crosses both divisions
boundaries. This occurs every time First Division, which is
responsible for painting, makes sure the surfaces in the space
about to be painted have been properly prepared and taped off.
The same inter-divisional coordination takes place when the
welders in the hull technician shop work with the machinist
mates in A-gang to repair the ice machine that belongs to the
Supply department. Two department heads discuss the process
with three division officers, who in turn talk to their three
chiefs. These chiefs discuss the details of the work with
7PAT is comprised of the workers involved in the process being
investigated. Members are selected based on their knowledge and
expertise in operational areas.
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their respective first classes to decide how best to have the
actual workers perform the work. To make the same process
match completely with the TQL methods, a PAT would be formed
to include the actual workers along with representative
members of each worker's chain of command. [Ref. 36:p. 11]
Quality improvement is an area where the Surface Navy
can use TQL principles. According to TQL guidelines the
definition of quality is provided by the customer. [Ref.
37 :p. 156] For example, when it comes to meeting operational
commitments in the Surface Navy the customer is the Fleet
Commander. It is the Fleet Commander that places ships
throughout the world to meet the needs of the Navy. Yet in
the present scheme of the Navy, a ship's overall readiness is
determined by other people such as the Type Commander or his
support staff, the local Squadron Commander, the Fleet
Training Group Commander, or the local Group Commander. In a
TQL Navy, the Fleet Commander would decide what level the
readiness of his assigned ships have attained. This level of
readiness would be determined by a ship's performance during
actual operations and not by a set of inspections.
In the current Surface Navy, inspections are relied on
heavily to test the quality of a ship's performance, a direct
violation of TQL. Perhaps the best example of this is the
Operational Propulsion Plant Examination (OPPE) that is given
to each ship on an 18 month basis to determine its operational
readiness in all areas involving engineering. This inspection
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includes performance of watch standers, the material condition
of the engineering plant, engineering knowledge levels of the
crew, damage control, and administrative programs. These
inspections originated after a period when Navy ships were
unable to get underway for operational commitments due to
engineering problems. Additionally, watch standers were being
injured, even killed due to unsafe practices. [Ref. 38]
Long term health problems such as hearing loss due to not
wearing hearing protection in the engineering spaces, or
kidney failures due continual heat exposure were occurring too
often. OPPE was the Navy's answer to these problems. Failure
in a single area causes a failure of the entire examination.
The inspection, as a tool, identifies, but does not correct
any problems that exist in a ship's engineering plant. Within
a TQL environment, this identification of problem areas is
better performed by the ship's force. Fear of failure is the
ship's driving force to pass an OPPE. Again this is all done
to inspect the quality of one phase of a ship's operational
readiness. No training is taking place. No systems are being
improved. There is no value added in that ships pass or fail
as they stand on that particular inspection.
Many expensive person hours are lost in both preparing
to pass an inspection and in completing the actual inspection
itself. Valuable fuel is spent in the underway time needed to
accomplish this 48-hour inspection. The OPPE inspection
teams, consisting of 5 members who range in rank from
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Lieutenant to Captain, spend many person .'ours in travel to
and from the ships besides the actual inspection time. The
travel costs alone for a team doing one inspection oi. a West
Coast OPPE are as follows:




The above costs exclude the pay and allowances for the
inspection team that averages $20,000 a month. [Ref. 39]
Light Off Examinations (LOE) are also given to ships by the
same inspector. at the same cost per inspection.8 The Type
Commanders average an additional $750,000 per LOE in getting
a ship into the conditions necessary to pass the inspection.
[Ref. 40] In the last 12 months, 120 OPPE's or LOE's were
administered on the West Coast. Th4 re were 90 successful
examinations and 30 failures. [Ref. 41] In either case, the
only positive contribution of the inspection to the ship is
the identification of discrepancies. Again, this task is
better performed by shipboard personnel.
In the TQL process each worker inspects his or her
work and rejects failures based upon a statistical process.
By doing this, unacceptable products no longer require
OLOE's are given to ships after long periods of time when the
engineering plants are idle. An example of this would be at the end
of a shipyard period.
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additional person hours to be transported, stored, and
reinspected. [Ref. 42:p. 62] The overall performance of the
engineering department will improve since those workers with
their hands on the equipment use statistical analysis daily to
monitor performance. The collection of statistical data
required to conduct such analysis is currently taking place on
ships throughout the fleet. Log sheets, with hourly and daily
entrees of operational parameters of equipment, are required
to be kept on board for two years. The OPPE inspection team
pours over these records to ensure that all recordings are
taken. Any out of limit parameters must be annotated with the
reason for the discrepancy and corrective actions taken by the
crew must be recorded. These data could be used to bring
equipment into statistical control so that quality could be
improved. When equipment is no longer within statistically
set tolerances, adjustments, repairs or replacements can be
made. Preventive maintenance could be based on the results of
these statistical records so that needless maintenance could
be eliminated.
Fear of reprisal for equipment that fails to meet
quality standards, according to TQL, should be removed from
the work place. This should be allowed to occur in the Navy
and in many instances it does. For example, when an
operational asset such as a radar is inoperative, the
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commanding officer sends a CASREP message.9  This message
seeks assistance for repairs and informs the Fleet Commander
that one of his ships has inoperative equipment that might
impair the ship's ability to fight. At times though, in an
attempt to appear to be 100 percent ready, entire battle
groups"° have reported to be CASREP free. This would appear
to be an inaccurate description of a battle group, given the
enormous amount of equipment that undergoes strenuous
workloads in a hostile, at sea environment. Few commanding
officers would want to be the ship which removed the CASREP
free status from the battle group.
Process improvement is a TQL principle that has
potential for use in the Navy. Engineering Operational
Sequencing System (EOSS) is an engineering document for
standardized operating and casualty control procedures for the
main engineering plant and its auxiliary equipments. Every
person in engineering must be familiar with its proper use and
must follow it strictly. Since the equipment operators are
the enlisted personnel, they use this document most often.
Twice a year, the engineering department is tasked by
Navy instruction to conduct an EOSS validation review. This
review consists of verifying that all the pages are up to date
9CASREP is short for Casualty Report, a formatted message that
requests assistance in repairing inoperative equipment.
10A Battle Group is a group of ships, usually centered around
an aircraft carrier that is capable of carrying out one of the
Navy's many missions. These include power projection, controlling
sea lines of communications, and sea control.
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and that the engineering systems description and procedures
contained therein are correct. Very often, this task is
assigned to the officer in charge of the engineering space
involved. Since the ofticer is not normally involved in using
the EOSS, (the equipment operators are the users of EOSS), it
can result in an improper EOSS validation review.
The idea of continuous process improvement is present,
but the wrong person is assigned to complete the task at hand.
A modification of how to conduct the EOSS validation review
would improve the EOSS two-fold. Under the TQL procedure, the
PAT would accomplish the task because they would be most
familiar with the EOSS. Also, they are the ones who could
identify problems, if any, because they are the users.
B. FLEET LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES
The OSI data provided information concerning the TQL
competencies currently being practiced in the fleet by SWOs.
These results will form the basis for the answer to our second
subsidiary research question.
I. OI Analysis
Statistical analysis of the OSI using SAS PROC MEANS
procedure provided the percentage of time SWO's spend on
technical, management and leadership functions. Results, as
expected, showed that SWOs spend the least time in technical
functions and a somewhat greater amount of time between
management and leadership functions. Figure 3 is a
representation of this analysis. There were no differences
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between junior and field grade officers. The importance of
these findings are that officers spend most of their time in
the areas of management and leadership. These findings are
PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT
ON TECH., T . AND LEAD.
TEHNI CAL C 17. W
LFADEWSMIWP C 34.oW'0
MA N 'rAIN C49. 0%
Figure 3
Percentage of Time Spent
On Tech., Mgmt, and Lead.
Source: Officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (extract)
important because they establish the fact that SWOs are not
technical experts, but are leaders and managers.
The remainder of the OSI data were analyzed using
SAS PROC FREQ procedure. We first examined management
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questionnaires to see what percentage of the SWOs perceive a
particular management task as a major part of their job. The
subjects, 266 SWOs who ranged from pay grades 01 to 06, were
divided into two categories. Junior officers, 01 to 03, made
up the first group, while field grade officers, 04 to 06, made
up the second group. The two groups were compared to deter-
mine if there are any differences in management tasks per-
formed by junior officers as compared to field grade officers.
Statistical results are provided in Table 3.
Table 3 suggests that there are differences between
junior officers and field grade officers in the management
activities that they perform. Compared to the field grade
officers, fewer junior officers responded that these
management activities are a major focus of their job.
Management activities included those requiring planning for
manpower, activity and future developments. Other management
activities analyzed included making judgments involving
operations and objects,11 and coordinating and purposeful
interaction with others. Planning is essential in a TQL
environment. This can be seen in the activities performed
from the ESC down to the PATs. While there are differences in
the amount of planning done by both the junior and senior
groups, it is obvious that planning is being done in the fleet
by each. Of course planning requires coordination among
"Objects refers to machinery, equipment and facilities.
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peers, subordinates and superiors involved in a particular
activity. Next, the leadership portions of the questionnaires
were analyzed. As stated earlier, TQL principles require both
lateral and vertical interactions to be successful. The
following analysis will explore the degree of interactions
transpiring in the fleet today. Again, the subjects were
divided into two groups as explained above. Table 4
illustrates the percentage of respondents who say how often
they interact with their superiors, peers and subordinates.
TABLE 4
LEADERSHIP: ORGANIZATION INTERACTION
UMW (VIMN DO VhU llIFMr W11H 1CMi:
01 - 03 04 - OJ
Never Routine Always Never Routine Always
1. SUPTERIRS? .02 .23 .75 00 .22 .78
2. PEERS? .06 .35 .59 .10 .34 .56
3. SLBCRDINATES? .06 .17 .77 .11 .12 .77
Source: Officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (extract)
Results on Table 4 indicate that over 70% of SWOs,
regardless of rank, interact often with their superiors and
subordinates. However, just over half of the respondents say
that they interact often with their peers. It shows that SWOs
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interact well above and belcw the chain of command but lack in
lateral command interaction. To further analyze the questions
on SWO interaction, we examined the different types of inter-
actions SWOs encounter in their current job and the percentage
of SWOs who indicated that those types of interactions are
important to them as indicated in Tables 5, 6 and 7.
In Table 5 below, we look at how SWOs interact with
superiors in the areas of giving and receiving advice and
information, along with receiving counseling. Although
results in Table 4 show that 75% of junior officers interact
often with their superiors, only 43.7% of junior officers
responded that "giving advice to superiors" is important. One
explanation to this result could be that most junior officers
perceive themselves as lacking in experience and expertise to
be able to give advice to superiors. However, as officers
become more senior in rank, more of them perceive giving
advice to superiors as very important. The junior officers'
perceptions that giving advice up the chain of command is
unimportant are not in congruence with TQL principles. With
TQL, subordinate input is highly valued. Therefore, junior




IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL INTERACTIONS
M1W H &IMi r ARE IMUEIONDU TYPES OF E IMAON IKU
H'*U.N1E IN IR (1REWBJ JCB?(With Your Superiors)
01 -03 04 - 06
LNIM IMV VERYII LNI I& VERYIM
1. GIVING ADVICE .22 .34 .44 .09 .20 .71
2. RECEIVINGADVICE .07 .28 .65 .12 .22 .66
3. GIVIN3 INFO .07 .28 .65 .12 .22 .66
4. RBCEIVING INIM .05 .15 .80 .01 .09 .90
5. RIBVIlGCLNSEL .05 .18 .77 .02 .17 .81
Source: Officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (extract)
Next, we examined SWO interaction with peers as seen
in Table 6. It is clear that only a small percentage of both
junior and field grade SWOs indicated that giving and/or
receiving advice or counselinq to or from peers is important
in their current job. It should be noted, however, that
within the same two groups, more than 50% of the respondents
indicated that receiving and giving information to peers is
important. Within the realm of the TQL philosophy, team work
and inter-organizational communications are essential. To
this end, advising, counseling and information sharing must be
pursued to a greater degree then those indicated in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL INTERACTIONS
H3V BEIMN17 ARE ME~ RIUMI?" OYF cw flflIW
WUJ EONTER IN 'WR RQr OB? (Wi t h Peer s)
01-03 04-06
UNI F B VERYIMF UNI IN VERYIMP
1. GIVING ADVICE .23 .37 .40 .29 .28 .43
2. RBaIlGAIVICE .27 .42 .32 .29 .32 .39
3. GIVING INi .12 .27 .61 .13 .22 .65
4. RBCEIVING INIR .12 .33 .55 .12 .21 .67
5. GIVIl3CUNSEL .50 .30 .20 .64 .16 .20
6. RECVIlG C1 SEL .60 .28 .12 .76 .16 .08
Source: Officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (extract)
Finally, we looked at SWO interaction with subordin-
ates. Table 4 shows that 77% of junior officers and field
grade officers responded that they interact often with their
subordinates. Results in Table 7 below show that a smaller
percentage of junior officers, as compared to field grade
officers, believe that receiving advice from subordinates is
important. Most junior officers have enlisted personnel as
their subordinates while field grade officers often have
junior officers working directly under them. It is possible
that junior officers do not value the advice given by their
subordinates as much as field grade officers value the advice
of their junior officers. Again, as mentioned before, in the
TQL environment, communications emanating from the lower end
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of the chain of command is equally important as communications
coming from other sources. Therefore a higher level of
participation from both groups in valuing all advice from
subordinates will create an environment more closely tied to
TQL.
TABLE 7
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL INTERACTIONS
I-3I INIIANr ARE IHE HIMNG TYPES OF HqINIArION
WIJ U ENi1UN IN VXR CURFM17 JOB?(With Subordinates)
01-03 04-06
INIP M VERYIMP IEvP &MF VERYIRF
1. GIVIN3ADVICE .08 .16 .76 .14 .14 .72
2. RECVING ADVICE .24 .33 .43 .23 .21 .56
3. GIVING INFO .06 .18 .76 .11 .14 .75
4. RECEIVI3 INFO .08 .16 .76 .10 .11 .79
5. GIVING XLNSEL .12 .19 .69 .25 .14 .62
6. RECVINI3GcX.NSEL .69 .16 .15 .85 .10 .05
Source: Officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (extract)
The final OSI leadership data that we analyzed dealt with
the degree of importance of the different job performance
characteristics in accomplishing the work the SWO's do in
their current job. These job performance characteristics are
the same leadership competencies taught in SWO leadership
courses. Table 8, below, is a summary of the findings.
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TABLE 8
LEADERSHIP: JOB PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
H1W IMfKIFTANr ARE iE I IUI1 JCB RAE FA 4IR IRiISTICS IN
ACOMLISHINGIUE VWKU WJ IX) IN 'IUR CURENT JCB?
01-03 04-06
LIN IAV VERYMF LNF &F PVERYI"P
1. USE OF I.TIPI.E .03 .20 .77 .03 .18 .79
INIUIEM STRATEGIES
2. TEAM HJILDING .04 .11 .85 .06 .14 .80
3. DEVELOPING
SLBCRDINATES .07 .10 .83 .20 .10 .70
4. OcNCEPIUALIZATIcN .16 .24 .60 .11 .23 .66
5. INITIATIVE .03 .09 .88 .01 .10 .89
6. PERSIS7EM .01 .09 .90 00 .07 .93
7. FOSITIVE AND
REALISTIC
EXPEBrATICNS .05 .13 .82 .12 .06 .82
Source: Officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (extraction)
A large percentage of SWOs in all ranks indicated that
the above described job performance characteristics are
important in accomplishing the work that they do in their
current job. In general, those job performance character-
istics are important since they are in line with TQL
principles. Two observations from Table 8 aroused our
curiosity. "Team Building" and "Developing Subordinates"
appear to decrease in importance as SWOs become field grade
officers. To identify any pattern or trend in the result, we
ran a SAS PROC FREQ procedure on those two categories in each
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Figure 4
Importance of Team Building
source: Officer Survey Instrument July, 1988 (extract)
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Importance of Developing Subordinates
Source: Officer Survey instrument, July 1988 (extract)
There is no identifiable pattern in "Team Building"
other than the observation that over 90% of pay grades 02 and
06 believed that "Team Building" is important in accomplishing
their work. At least 75% of respondents across all ranks
demonstrated the belief that team building is important to
their job. In most pay grades, the results were even higher.
Therefore, the team building concept of TQL is perceived as
important in the Surface Navy.
One notable, surprising result was found in the area
of "developing subordinates". Over 90% of SWOs in pay grade
01 believe that developing subordinates is important. But, as
they go up in rank to pay grade 05, fewer of them believe that
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developing subordinates is important. It appears that as a
junior SWO moves up in pay grade, he or she loses sight of the
importance of developing subordinates as a part of their
professional obligations. The importance of developing
subordinates increased, however, for the SWO in pay grade 06.
From these observations it can be seen that an understanding
of the importance of subordinate development exists within our
mid-grade officers. Only after satisfying this need will the
SWO Navy be in compliance with TQL requirements.
The OSI data provided valuable information concerning
the leadership and management competencies supportive of TQL
that officers reported as present in the Surface Navy.
Examples of competencies present in the Surface Navy are team
building, work scheduling, and persistence. The same data
also indicated where the Surface Navy leadership and
management competencies fail to meet TQL requirements.
C. NAVY LEADERSHIP COURSES
The leadership training of SWOs is done in two phases. In
phase one, as division officers and department heads, the
leadership training comes in the form of LMET. Later in their
careers as executive or commanding officers, they receive
their leadership training in the form of the Command
Excellence Course. The proceeding discussion analyzes current
Navy leadership courses taught to SWOs to determine if TQL
competency requirements are being met.
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1. LMET
LMET occurs primarily at Surface Warfare School
Command (SWOSCOLCOM) at Newport, RI. The Surface Warfare
Officer Division Officer Course (SWOSDOC) LMET covers a wide
range of topics including counseling, communicating with
immediate superiors and subordinates, leadership styles and
learning styles. The classes are taught in a less structured
fashion as compared to the previous SWOSDOC courses (e.g.,
navigation), and no tests are given. Role playing, case
studies, group participation as well as instructor lecture are
used in the classroom to teach LMET.
The LMET course uses the term "characteristic" in
place of the term competency. The thirteen characteristics of
an outstanding division officer are listed in Table 9, below,
and further defined in Appendix E.
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Table 9






6. MANAGES TIME EFFICIENTLY
7. ENFORCES HIGH STANDARDS
8. PROMOTES GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE
CHIEF





Source: Student Guide, Naval Leadership Course, SWOSDOC.
The first day of class centers on the different roles
a division officer must fill along with his duties and
responsibilities. LMET suggests the division officer needs to
be a motivator, educator, manager, and leader as well as a
contributing member of the wardroom. These roles compare
favorably with Deming's fourteen points that stress the
need for management to institute training and leadership,
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coordinate with all departments with cooperation and to remove
barriers that demoralize workers. Both IMET and Deming stress
the importance of short and long term planning. Additionally,
they each stress the need for quality as is evidenced by the
need for an outstanding Division Officer to enforce standards
in the LMET environment, and Deming's insistence on improving
quality.
LMET describes the characteristics which make a
division officer outstanding (See Table 9). TQL principles
evident in these characteristics are found in the following:
Seeks information; plans; enforces high standards; promotes
good working relationships with the chief; influences;
communicates; and manages time efficiently. [Ref. 43:p. 1.7-
2] Other characteristics listed, even though they are not in
complete agreement with TQL, do not necessarily add to the
requirements associated with TQL principles.
Deming's ideas surface on day two of the LMET course
when socialized power is discussed. [Ref. 44:p. 2.2-5) To be
effective, the division must, under the division officer's
leadership, define goals that inspire "pride in the
organization". By doing this the group will accomplish more
than if it had no say in its objectives. LMET calls for group
participation to share ideas and gain a common vision for the
command. LMET stresses long and short term planning in
dealing with the chain of command both upward and downward.
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LMET stresses rewards and punishments as motivators.
Deming disagrees. The former calls for standards to be set,
performance is then measured against this standard, with a
reward or punishment for falling above or below the standard.
Deming argued that for every one above average, there is one
below average performer. At a recent Deming management
seminar, Dr. Deming named employee ranking as the biggest
hurdle to worker moral and therefore output. [Ref. 45]
Workers who produce within three standard deviations of the
mean output are all within acceptable tolerances, claims
Deming. While rewarding over achievers is acceptable, those
workers below the three standard deviations must be better
trained or moved to more aptly suited work. He states, "I
have yet to see a work standard that includes any trace of a
system which would help anyone do a better job". [Ref. 46:p.
78] He also contends that standards ensure wastage and
dissatisfied workers. Deming suggests that if such standards
are removed, un-threatened workers shown how to produce vice
how much to produce will do the best they are capable of
doing.
LMET lists six leadership styles on a continuum.
[Ref. 47:p. 34] The first leadership style is "pacesetter".
This leader's strongest preference is to do the job himself.
This practice is in conflict with TQL principles, because it
does not promote team work and inter-organizational communi-
cations. The next leadership style is "authoritarian". This
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leader is firm but fair and solicits some inputs from his
subordinates. Thus, the authoritarian is using some TQL
principles, but falls short in involving his subordinates in
decision making. After getting inputs, he still makes all the
final decisions. The "affiliator" is a leader who puts peoples
concerns before task accomplishment. While TQL calls for
being concerned with subordinates, a proper balance must be
maintained between people and tasks. The "democratic" leader
uses the TQL principle of inputs from subordinates in that he
manages by soliciting suggestions from his people before he
makes decisions. While not always a traditional Navy
leadership practice, this style is the preferred TQL
leadership method. A more traditional leader in the Navy is
the "coercer". This type of leader, as the name indicates,
violates TQL principles. A coercer insists that his
subordinates do as they are told to do, without question.
This leader asks for no subordinate input. The final LMET
leadership style is the "coach". This leader demonstrates a
very strong interest in developing subordinates. TQL
principles are consistent with this type of leader.
LMET maintains that a division officer will use one or
two styles most of the time, but will on occasion use all the
styles depending upon the situation. TQL, on the other hand,
prefers leaders to always use the democratic and coach
leadership styles since they rely heavily on subordinate
inputs and development. Coercers and pacesetters do not
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belong in a TQL environment. They demoralize their
subordinates to the point that they lose pride in the quality
of their work. Authoritarian leaders might survive in a TQL
organization since they at least ask for subordinate input
before making all decisions themselves. An affiliator might
survive the TQL litmus test, but will probably fail to meet
the production requirements of his or her job.
The command climate found on each ship would play a
role in the motivation of the crew and therefore the leader-
ship styles that could be used by officers. Six elements are
used to measure the command climate in LMET. First is
flexibility. This must be high in both the Deming philosophy
and in LMET, however the definitions of flexibility are
different in the two systems. In TQL, flexibility means that
new ideas are taken in and rules such as production quotas
give way to quality. In the LMET sense, flexibility means
being prepared to adapt to changes in set plans. The second
element in command climate is responsibility. In LMET
responsibility refers to having subordinates assume as much
responsibility as practical for any given task. TQL also
emphasizes the delegation of the responsibility for quality to
the lowest level workers. LMET conflicts with TQL in the next
element, standards, by stating that the manager must place
much emphasis on improving performance by setting standards.
However, the standard set is not specific to quality --
standards could be set on quantity. Deming argues that the
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emphasis must be placed on higher quality that results from
managers allowing workers to set quality vice quantity quotas.
Individual rewards, along with punishments, represent
another element that needs to change in command climate to fit
into the TQL structure. TQL advocates feel that workers gain
satisfaction through continual quality improvement of their
output. Rewards, in the Navy, are often given based on
quantity and not quality.
The next element of LMET's command climate, clarity,
fits well with TQL principles. This element states that high
clarity in a command reflects workers who have a vision of
where their command is going, as is called for with TQL. This
vision is created through careful planning and dissemination
of the plans to the workers. The final element of command
climate is team spirit. This element characterizes an
organization where all workers work in harmony for the common
good of the command. Proud workers who trust each other at
all levels of the organization are required for TQL to work.
LMET, in its six elements of command climate,
partially supports TQL principles in the areas of flexibility,
responsibility and standards. To make these elements fully
supportive of TQL, the formation of these elements must
revolve around the value of workers' inputs. Clarity and team
spirit are the elements of command climate that are in
congruence with TQL principles. The element rewards, as
mentioned above, requires changing to be in compliance with
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TQL principles. An acceptable alternative to the present LMET
element is the use of team rewards. All punishment for
failure to produce satisfactorily should be removed.
2. Command Ezcellence
Command Excellence is the current device for training
perspective executive and commanding officers in the areas of
leadership. These schools are six weeks in length and are
taught at SWOSCOLCOM, Newport, Rhode Island. The following is
an analysis of the leadership competencies included in these
courses as compared to the Navalized principles of TQL.
The course is based on the Command Effectiveness Model
shown in Figure 2 on page 10. This model is centered around
thirteen themes of personnel characteristics or behaviors,
that have been found to make COs better than average
performers. Each of the characteristics is placed into one of
three major areas: People, Relationships and Activities.
Starting with People, the model describes the
characteristics of outstanding COs, XOs, wardrooms,and chiefs
and crews, which are congruent to the TQL philosophy. These
characteristics are: supporting command philosophy;
developing subordinates; emphasizing training; ensuring
standards are enforced; acting for command-wide effectiveness;
relying on strong leadership; taking ownership in own work;
living up to standards; and working as a team. These
attributes are similar to leadership aspects of TQL discussed
before.
67
The second major area of the model is Relationships,
which is divided into CO-XO relationship, Chain of Command,
and External relationships. The emphasis on effective
communications, both up and down the chain of command is fully
supportive of the TQL principles. The last major area of the
model is Activities. Again, several similarities with TQL are
noted. These similarities include: planning at all levels;
publicizing all plans; continuously monitoring standards;
enforcing standards at all levels; communicating frequently;
listening to all employees; giving explanations with commands;
rewarding people; giving feedback; promoting teamwork; and
training at all levels.
However, the Command Excellence Model does not fully
employ TQL methods in all areas. Those areas are:
continuously improving the products and services; improving
the system; using analytical methods to improve the system;
and driving fear out of the work place. It is important to
incorporate these principles to the command effectiveness
model to make it fit the TQL requirements.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The results of the comparison of Deming's principles of
management and the Navalized TQL principles show both similar-
ities and differences do appear. The two primary areas of
dissimilarity occur in evaluation of employees through a
rating system, and the practice of awarding contracts to the
lowest bidder. As mentioned in the results section of this
thesis, the low bid requirement of the Navy is provided for by
law. The rating system currently forms the basis for
promotion and retention. Furthermore, the Navalized principle
dealing with inspecting smarter never completely conformed to
the TQL requirement of using SPC as the only basis of
inspections.
The results of the telephone interviews indicate that TQL
must start at the top with both a vision and training for the
command. Although resistance to change proved to be an
obstacle in the beginning, once successful results were
produced by the system, each command's TQL program overcame
this inertia.
Many TQL principles are currently practiced in the fleet
as evidenced by the findings from the OSI data. However,
several TQL principles are missing fleet practices. These
include subordinate development, lateral interaction with
peers, reliance on inspections, flow of suggestions from
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junior to superior officer, and reception of suggestions by
junior officers from their subordinates.
The analysis of Navy Leadership Courses indicate that the
foundation of TQL training exists in the officer corp. While
not all competencies required for TQL are currently included
in the courses, the addition of these competencies will not
substantially alter the courses.
The use of final inspections to insure quality needs to be
removed to fully embrace the TQL concept. This change will
one of be the hardest to make in the implementation of TQL.
The time honored tradition of inspections will remain in the
Navy for the foreseeable future. With time and the positive
results associated with the use of TQL, we feel the Navy will
eventually move to meet this principle.
We feel further investigation is required to resolve the
issue of annual merit ratings since so much of the Navy's
promotion and retention system is based solely on individual
performance evaluation. The Navy's current policy of "up or
out" flies in the face of TQL's stance that all employees who
perform within three standard deviations of the mean are
acceptable performers. Therefore the changes required for
full TQL implementation will have to wait. In the meantime,
the Navy should proceed to make changes in the current
evaluation forms to include TQL criteria such as teamwork and
subordinate development.
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The end of awarding contracts to the lowest bidder will
require a change in current law. Therefore, a change from
this practice, will require a considerable amount of time to
pass before it takes place.
TQL encompasses many new and different leadership concepts
to the surface warfare community. Equally important, it also
utilizes many surface warfare leadership skills and techniques
already in place.
We believe that with TQL the Surface Navy will be more
efficient and therefore either require less manpower to
accomplish its missions, or be able to meet its mission in a
better manner. Measurements of this will be less turnover,
lower absenteeism, higher productivity as seen in higher rate
of successful operational commitments.
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VI. 'ZCOMMENDATIONS
These recommendations are based the results found in our
literature review, telephone interviews, and analysis of OSI
data. The recommendations are made in two parts. In the
first part we discuss the Navy's TQL implementation plan. In
the second part we recommend changes to the leadership courses




The Navy's implementation of TQL should proceed in a
slow, methodical manner. This is necessary due to the
paradigm change required of the task.
The chain of command, throughout the surface warfare
community, should be converted from top to bottom to avoid
making subordinate links in the 7hain of command islands of
TQL. This will irsure that the ship is supported by the
squadron commander, which is supported by the group commander,
which is supported by both the oDerational and administrative
chains of command. Similarly, training must continue to be a
top-down evolution.
2. Leadership Course Improvement
Recommendations are:
The basis of quality in TQL is rooted in SPC. Courses
should incorporate statistical analysis techniques that
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replace inspections as a means of insuring quality goods and
services.
Courses should emphasize subordinate development,
particularly in the department head leadership course. The
OSI results show this competency to be lacking among mid-grade
level officers.
Courses should address lateral interactions within the
chain of command. According to the OSI data, peers are an
under-used source of information, even though they are a most
likely source for junior officers to tap.
Courses should instruct Junior Officers in the
importance of giving advice to superiors and receiving advice
from subordinates. The chain of command is the information
path of an organization. All members of an organization, when
their knowledge is shared, can contribute to its successes.
Courses should remove "coercer" and "pacesetter" as
acceptable leadership styles. Leaders need to avoid the use
of these lesser forms of leadership.
Courses should remove rewards and punishments as a
means of motivating workers. Leadership must be substituted in
their place.
TQL will better prepare the Surface Navy for future
combat missions. It must be understood, though, that this
form of management, which emphasizes participative decision
making, is not necessarily applicable to all military
situations such as combat.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF COMMANDS INTERVIEWED
1. Ship's Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA)
Little Creek, Virginia




4. Hull, Maintenance and Electrical (HM & E) Division
CINCPACFLT
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
5. Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC)
San Diego, California
6. Naval Supply Center
Norfolk, Virginia
7. Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center, Pacific
(FADCPAC)
San Diego, California
8. McClellan Air Force Base
Sacramento, California
9. Sacramento Army Depot
Sacramento, California
10. Naval Supply Center
San Diego, California
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11. Navy Aviation Supply Office
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
12. Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP)
Cherry Point, North Carolina
13. Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP)
Norfolk, Virginia
14. Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP)
Alameda, California
15. Chief of Naval Education and Training
Pensacola, Florida
16. Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP)
Pensacola, Florida




19. Naval Supply Center
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii





1. Now does TQL fit into overall scheme of things at your
command? (Problem solving? Planning? Quality vs. time?
Moral? Budget results?)
2. How does TQL add to your problems? (Same as above?)
3. How does/did your command deal with resistance to
change?
4. Where does TQL go in your command from here?
(Planning? Operations? Away?)
5. Does TQL get full support from within your command?
(Above you? Below you? Contemporaries?)
6. Does your command get full support from those outside
your command? (Above and below the chain of command?




SECTION C: MANAGEMENT AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
1. PLANNING AND SCHEDULING - Developing schedules or
work plans (including your own) assigning tasks to workers and
specifying goals and completion dates.
A. To what extent is work scheduling a part of your
current job?
3. MANPOWER PLANNING - Determining billet or personnel
requirements, planning personnel resource utilization, coding
billets, maintaining manpower authorization documents and
performing other related manpower activities.
A. To what extent is manpower planning a part of
your current job?
4. ACTIVITY PLANNING - Planning for the ongoing
operation of a program or organizational unit.
A. To what extent is activity planning a part of
your current job?
5. PRE-DEPLOYMENT PLANNING - Making necessary
arrangements prior to deployment of the operational unit
(ship, squadron, submarine, battalion, etc.) to which you are
assigned.
A. To what extent is planning for deployments a part
of your current job?
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6. PLANNING FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT - Anticipating
requirements and making strategic decisions regarding the
future development of a program, project, activity or
organizational unit.
A. To what extent is planning for future
developments a part of your current job?
7. PROCESSING INFORMATION AND IDEAS - Converting or
preparing data for use, utilizing basic information-handling
processes. Includes compiling, summarizing, transcribing,
classifying, categorizing or coding information (includes hand
and computer generated information).
A. To what extent is processing information and
ideas a part of your current job?
9. ANALYZING AND SYNTHESIZING INFORMATION AND IDEAS -
Breaking down information into facts, principles or
assumptions; interpreting the results; and integrating
information to establish new facts, hypotheses or theories.
A. To what extent is analyzing and synthesizing
information or ideas a part of your current job?
10. JUDGMENTS INVOLVING PEOPLE - Making decisions or
assessments about people. This includes superiors, peers and
subordinates within your command and those you work with
outside your command.
A. To what extent is making judgments involving
people a part of your current job?
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11. JUDGMENTS INVOLVING OPERATIONS AND OBJECTS - Making
decisions or assessments about programs, operation of an
organization, facilities or equipment, which do not directly
involve decisions about people.
A. To what extent do you make judgments involving
operations and objects as part of your current job?
16. SUPERVISING AND DIRECTING - Delineating subordinates'
responsibilities and reviewing their work.
A. To what extent is directing or supervising others
a part of your current job?
19. COORDINATING - Establishing and sustaining
relationships and interchanging information aimed at helping
to achieve job objectives.
A. To what extent is coordinating a part of your
current job?
20. INTERACTING - Conducting purposeful discussions with
others in order to exchange or gather information for a
particular reason.
A. To what extent is purposeful interaction with
others a part of your current job?
26. USING PROCEDURES, TECHNIQUES OR PROCESSES - Using
procedures, techniques or processes in a verbal, mathematical
or other systematic approach to a problem or action.
A. To what extent do you use procedures, techniques
or processes as part of your current job?
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30. INSPECTIONS - Planning, preparing for or
participating in inspections (includes follow-up action on
inspection results).
A. To what extent are you involved in inspections as
part of your current job?
SECTION D: LEADERSHIP
1. Estimate the PERCENTAGE OF TIME you spend performing





2. Indicate how often you interact with your superiors,
peers and subordinates in the performance of your current job.
3. Indicate the importance of the various types of
interaction you encounter in your current job.
4. Described below are several job performance
characteristics which might be associated with naval officers.
Indicate how important how you feel these characteristics are
in accomplishing the work you do in your current job.







G. POSITIVE AND REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
Source: officer Survey Instrument, July 1988 (Extract)
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APPENDIX D
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350-2000
SerO0/00500214
13 August 1990
MEXORANDUM TO ALL FLAG OFFICERS
Subj: TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP
1. Today's demanding geopolitical and fiscal environments
pose unique challenges and offer unique opportunities for the
Navy. More than ever, we need to do our jobs efficiently and
safely. Flexibility, responsiveness and readiness, our
hallmarks, will increasingly characterize naval operations of
the future. The growth which characterized the Navy in the
Eighties will not continue into the Nineties. While we work
to ensure we have the resources available to do the job with
an acceptable degree of risk, we will not have the quantities
available to us we have had in the past. That is the reality
of the Nineties and beyond.
2. We need something to take up the slack, and that
something is quality. Combat readiness is the Navy's product,
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and that remains the constant in the equation. However,
quality will become ever more important as our overall force
levels and budgets decline. In business terms, we need to
achieve and maintain the superiority of the Navy product and
improve it continuously. With your help, I intend to do just
that.
3. Slick hype campaigns and catchy slogans are not what
I have in mind. Nor do I want to impose another check list or
inspection upon our people. Instead, I want us to structure
a quietly effective effort to improve quality in the Navy
which makes sense to our people, helps them get the job done
properly, and helps us all manage our resources better. The
Navy is already the leader in applying quality-centered
management in the shore establishment. Their approach is
cailed "Total Quality Management," or TQM. This management
philosophy, taught in Japan by Dr. W. Edwards Deming, has been
credited with many of their revolutionary improvements in
quality. I want to continue that initiative ashore and expand
it to include Operating Forces. I've decided to call our
approach for the Operating Forces "Total Quality Leadership"
(TQL) because of the importance of the unique role that Navy
leadership plays in developing and implementing our opera-
tional objectives. Since TQM is a management philosophy, we
will need to adapt its approach and techniques to the Navy
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operational environment--its processes, procedures and
"products."
4. The message of TQL is revolutionary and its changes
what we should expect from ourselves and our people. Its
central theme is the need to identify, analyze, improve and
redesign the individual processes of our operations in order
to improve and redesign the product. TQL's primary thrusts
are the continuous improvement of quality, total commitment to
meeting the needs of the "customer;" emphasis on improving
product quality through improvement of process; and focus on
leadership, training and personnel management. In the Navy,
the Secretariat is applying these principles to the acquisi-
tion process, and numerous Navy shore commands have already
adopted its methods with positive results well beyond original
expectations. It's time now for us to expand this to the
entire Navy, including the Operating Forces.
5. To be effective, we must keep TQL targeted on the
practical payoff we expect: continuous improvements in
processes to produce continuously improving results. I am
convinced TQL can be applied to solve problem areas in ships,
squadrons and shore commands and strengthen our overall
performance and readiness. By way of example, take a ship in
REFTRA which is having problems setting Condition ZEBRA in an
acceptable time. Familiar and perhaps typical responses might
be come combination of exhortations, threats, blame-laying and
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"motivation" through repetitive drilling. Maybe these work,
maybe they don't. The problem is that, all too often, no one
really sits down to analyze the situation--they just say "fix
it." With a TQL approach, emphasis instead would be on
analyzing the entire ZEBRA-setting process, reviewing
component processes for each repair party and zone, collecting
data to identify causes of problems, and then determining ways
to solve those problems. Causes might include insufficient
manning, poorly identified ZEBRA fittings, unclear assignment
of responsibility for specific fittings, inefficient division
of effort, improper or insufficient training, inadequate
supervision, or poor communications. Once identified, the
roots of these problems could be eliminated. The examination
of the ZEBRA-setting process would be accomplished not only by
officers and chiefs,but would rely on the active participation
of the repair parties themselves. Statistical analysis and
elementary timing and measuring techniques would be used to
help identify and chart the glitches. Most importantly, while
the solution that the TQL process produces would be more
enduring than recriminations on the 1MC, the effort to improve
the setting of ZEBRA would be a continuing one.
6. The most important aspect of the Navy's TQL program is
support from the top. I am on board and ready to lead the
team effort, and that's where you come in. We need to
recognize that this will be a long-term undertaking which will
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take years to implement fully. I want to start now. To get
the ball rolling, I ask each of you to become ftmiliar with
the TQM management approach by reading one or more current
books on the subject which may be found in all libraries and
book stores. I recommend the folluwing:
(a) The Deming Management Method by Mary Walton
(b) KAIZEN by Magaaki Imai
(c) Out ot the Crisis by W. Edwards Deming
I have also enclosed a draft "navalized" version of
Dr. Dering's Fourteen Points to get you started on thinking
about how we may begin to apply the valuable TQL tool to the
Navy. We must continue to refine *hem as we go about
introducing TQL iato the Fleet. I intend to discuss a pilot
plan for implementing TQL for selected ships, squadrons and
shore commands at the Fall CINCs' Conference in October. I am
convinced that our emphasis on quality is the right course for
the navy as we sail into perhaps the most challenging sea we
have yet encountered.




CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSTANDING DIVISION OFFICERS
1. TAKES INITIATIVE
a. Is a self starter; is not overly dependent of CPO
b. Is an advocate up the chain of command for
division's functional needs
c. Takes risks to gain experience
2. FOLLOWS THROUGH
a. Persists untIl Job is completed
b. Monitors progress
c. Is out and about the work area
3. DEMONSTRATES SELF-CONFIDENCE
a. Takes a stand when appropriate
b. Confronts difficult problems
c. Demonstrates a "can do" attitude
d. Demonstrates confidence when dealing with seniors
and peers
e. Doesn't worry about being liked
f. Is not overwhelmed by criticism
g. Acknowledges when he/she doesn't know the answer
4. SEEKS INFORMATION
a. Is an active learner; uses many resources
b. Asks questions
c. Learns from own mistakes
d. Refers to studies, regulations and technical manuals
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e. Learns where to find information
f. Acknowledges what he/she does not know
g. Determines facts before acting





d. Sets personal goals
6. MANAGES TIME EFFICIENTLY
a. Balances division and warfare-qualification demands
b. Seeks ways to do tasks efficiently
c. Determines optimal amount of time to devote to tasks
7. ENFORCES HIGH STANDARDS
a. Communicates Navy, command, and divisional standards
to enlisted personnel
b. Personally models high standards
c. Monitors
d. Provides constructive feedback
e. Holds division accountable for meeting established
standards
f. Encourages high standards through rewards and
discipline
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8. PROMOTES GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE
CHIEF
a. Sets up clear division of duties and
responsibilities
b. Delegates appropriately
c. Gives and receives necessary information
d. Works with self-assurance
e. Assesses and respects Chief'S level of expertise
9. DEMONSTRATES CONCERN FOP OTHERS
a. Stands up for subordinates
b. Learns subordinates' capabilities
c. Makes time for subordinates
d. Listens to subordinates
e. Maintains proper DO role in dealing with
subordinates
f. Resolves conflicts between realistic expectations
10. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY
a. Makes self accountable for division's performance
b. Demonstrates willingness to make difficult decisions
and accepts the consequences
c. Represents policies passed down from above as
his/her own
11. INFLUENCES
a. Learns and uses idiosyncrasies of the command
b. Prepares thoroughly in order to persuade
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c. Acts as advocate up the chain of command for
division's needs
d. Empowers subordinates
e. Demonstrates technical credibility
f. Maintains self-control
12. COMMUNICATES
a. Keeps others informed via the chain of command
b. Demonstrates clear verbal skills
c. Writes clearly and effectively
d. Uses command communication style
e. Interprets nonverbal behavior
13. PROBLEM-SOLVES
a. Sizes up the key aspects of a situation
b. Identifies cause-and-effect relationships
c. Pulls facts together to determine a solution
Source: Student Guide, Naval Leadership Course, SWOSDOC.
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